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Abstract
We consider a scenario involving computations over a massive dataset stored distributedly across multiple workers, which is at
the core of distributed learning algorithms. We propose Lagrange Coded Computing (LCC), a new framework to simultaneously
provide (1) resiliency against stragglers that may prolong computations; (2) security against Byzantine (or malicious) workers
that deliberately modify the computation for their benefit; and (3) (information-theoretic) privacy of the dataset amidst possible
collusion of workers. LCC, which leverages the well-known Lagrange polynomial to create computation redundancy in a novel
coded form across workers, can be applied to any computation scenario in which the function of interest is an arbitrary multivariate
polynomial of the input dataset, hence covering many computations of interest in machine learning. LCC significantly generalizes
prior works to go beyond linear computations. It also enables secure and private computing in distributed settings, improving
the computation and communication efficiency of the state-of-the-art. Furthermore, we prove the optimality of LCC by showing
that it achieves the optimal tradeoff between resiliency, security, and privacy, i.e., in terms of tolerating the maximum number of
stragglers and adversaries, and providing data privacy against the maximum number of colluding workers. Finally, we show via
experiments on Amazon EC2 that LCC speeds up the conventional uncoded implementation of distributed least-squares linear
regression by up to 13.43×, and also achieves a 2.36×-12.65× speedup over the state-of-the-art straggler mitigation strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The massive size of modern datasets necessitates computational tasks to be performed in a distributed fashion, where the data
is dispersed among many servers that operate in parallel [1]. As we “scale out” computations across many servers, however,
several fundamental challenges arise. Cheap commodity hardware tends to vary greatly in computation time, and it has been
demonstrated [2]–[4] that a small fraction of servers, referred to as stragglers, can be 5 to 8 times slower than the average, thus
creating significant delays in computations. Also, as we distribute computations across many servers, massive amounts data
must be moved between them to execute the computational tasks, often over many iterations of a running algorithm, and this
creates a substantial bandwidth bottleneck [5]. Distributed computing systems are also much more susceptible to adversarial
servers, making security and privacy a major concern [6]–[8].
We consider a general scenario in which the computation is carried out distributively across several workers, and propose
Lagrange Coded Computing (LCC), a new framework to simultaneously provide
1) resiliency against straggler workers that may prolong computations;
2) security against Byzantine (or malicious, adversarial) workers, with no computational restriction, that deliberately send
erroneous data in order to affect the computation for their benefit; and
3) (information-theoretic) privacy of the dataset amidst possible collusion of workers.
LCC can be applied to any computation scenario in which the function of interest is an arbitrary multivariate polynomial of
the input dataset. This covers many computations of interest in machine learning, such as various gradient and loss-function
computations in learning algorithms and tensor algebraic operations (e.g., low-rank tensor approximation). The key idea of
LCC is to encode the input dataset using the well-known Lagrange polynomial, in order to create computational redundancy in
a novel coded form across the workers. This redundancy can then be exploited to provide resiliency to stragglers, security
against malicious servers, and privacy of the dataset.
Specifically, as illustrated in Fig. 1, using a master-worker distributed computing architecture with N workers, the goal
is to compute f(Xi) for every Xi in a large dataset X = (X1, X2, . . . , XK), where f is a given multivariate polynomial
with degree deg f . To do so, N coded versions of the input dataset, denoted by X˜1, X˜2, . . . , X˜N are created, and the workers
then compute f over the coded data, as if no coding is taking place. For a given N and f , we say that the tuple (S,A, T ) is
achievable if there exists an encoding and decoding scheme that can complete the computations in the presence of up to S
stragglers, up to A adversarial workers, whilst keeping the dataset private against sets of up to T colluding workers.
Our main result is that by carefully encoding the dataset the proposed LCC achieves (S,A, T ) if (K+T−1) deg f+S+2A+1 ≤
N . The significance of this result is that by one additional worker (i.e., increasing N by 1) LCC can increase the resiliency
to stragglers by 1 or increase the robustness to malicious servers by 1/2, while maintaining the privacy constraint. Hence,
this result essentially extends the well-known optimal scaling of error-correcting codes (i.e., adding one parity can provide
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Figure 1. An overview of the problem considered in this paper, where the goal is to evaluate a not necessarily linear function f on a given
dataset X = (X1, X2, . . . , XK) using N workers. Each worker applies f on a possibly coded version of the inputs (denoted by X˜i’s). By
carefully designing the coding strategy, the master can decode all the required results from a subset of workers, in the presence of stragglers
(workers s1, ..., sS) and Byzantine workers (workers m1, ...,mA), while keeping the dataset private to colluding workers (workers c1, ..., cT ).
robustness against one erasure or 1/2 error in optimal maximum distance separable codes) to the distributed secure computing
paradigm.
We prove the optimality of LCC by showing that it achieves the optimal tradeoff between resiliency, security, and privacy. In
other words, any computing scheme (under certain complexity constrains on the encoding and decoding designs) can achieve
(S,A, T ) if and only if (K + T − 1) deg f + S + 2A+ 1 ≤ N .1 This result further extends the scaling law in coding theory to
private computing, showing that any additional worker enables data privacy against 1/degf additional colluding workers.
Finally, we specialize our general theoretical guarantees for LCC in the context of least-squares linear regression, which is
one of the elemental learning tasks, and demonstrate its performance gain by optimally suppressing stragglers. Leveraging
the algebraic structure of gradient computations, several strategies have been developed recently to exploit data and gradient
coding for straggler mitigation in the training process (see, e.g., [9]–[13]). We implement LCC for regression on Amazon EC2
clusters, and empirically compare its performance with the conventional uncoded approaches, and two state-of-the-art straggler
mitigation schemes: gradient coding (GC) [10], [14]–[16] and matrix-vector multiplication (MVM) based approaches [9], [11].
Our experiment results demonstrate that compared with the uncoded scheme, LCC improves the run-time by 6.79×-13.43×.
Compared with the GC scheme, LCC improves the run-time by 2.36×-4.29×. Compared with the MVM scheme, LCC improves
the run-time by 1.01×-12.65×.
Related works. There has recently been a surge of interest on using coding theoretic approaches to alleviate key bottlenecks
(e.g., stragglers, bandwidth, and security) in distributed machine learning applications (e.g., [10], [14], [15], [17]–[25]). As
we discuss in more detail in Section III-A, the proposed LCC scheme significantly advances prior works in this area by
1) generalizing coded computing to arbitrary multivariate polynomial computations, which are of particular importance in
learning applications; 2) extending the application of coded computing to secure and private computing; 3) reducing the
computation/communication load in distributed computing (and distributed learning) by factors that scale with the problem
size, without compromising security and privacy guarantees; and 4) enabling 2.36×-12.65× speedup over the state-of-the-art in
distributed least-squares linear regression in cloud networks.
Secure multiparty computing (MPC) and secure/private Machine Learning (e.g., [26], [27]) are also extensively studied topics
that address a problem setting similar to LCC. As we elaborate in Section III-A, compared with conventional methods in this
area (e.g., the celebrated BGW scheme for secure/private MPC [26]), LCC achieves substantial reduction in the amount of
randomness, storage overhead, and computation complexity.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND EXAMPLES
We consider the problem of evaluating a multivariate polynomial f : V→ U over a dataset X = (X1, . . . , XK),2 where V
and U are vector spaces of dimensions M and L, respectively, over the field F. We assume a distributed computing environment
1More accurately, when N < Kdegf − 1, we prove that the optimal tradeoff is instead given by K(S + 2A+ deg f · T + 1) ≤ N , which can be achieved
by a variation of the LCC scheme, as described in Appendix D.
2We focus on the non-trivial case where K > 0 and f is not constant.
3with a master and N workers (Figure 1), in which the goal is to compute Y1 , f(X1), . . . , YK , f(XK). We denote the total
degree3 of the polynomial f by deg f .
In this setting each worker has already stored a fraction of the dataset prior to computation, in a possibly coded manner.
Specifically, for i ∈ [N ] (where [N ] , {1, . . . , N}), worker i stores X˜i , gi(X1, . . . , XK), where gi is a (possibly random)
function, refered to as the encoding function of that worker. We restrict our attention to linear encoding schemes4, which
guarantee low encoding complexity and simple implementation.
Each worker i ∈ [N ] computes Y˜i , f(X˜i) and returns the result to the master. The master waits for a subset of fastest
workers and then decodes Y1, . . . , YK . This procedure must satisfy several additional requirements:
• Resiliency, i.e., robustness against stragglers. Formally, the master must be able to obtain the correct values of Y1, . . . , YK
even if up to S workers fail to respond (or respond after the master executes the decoding algorithm), where S is the
resiliency parameter of the system. A scheme that guarantees resiliency against S stragglers is called S-resilient.
• Security, i.e., robustness against adversaries. That is, the master must be able to obtain correct values of Y1, . . . , YK even
if up to A workers return arbitrarily erroneous results, where A is the security parameter of the system. A scheme that
guarantees security against A adversaries is called A-secure.
• Privacy, i.e., the workers must remain oblivious to the content of the dataset, even if up to T of them collude, where T is
the privacy parameter of the system. Formally, for every T ⊆ [N ] of size at most T , we must have I(X; X˜T ) = 0, where I
is mutual information, X˜T represents the collection of the encoded dataset stored at the workers in T , and X is seen as
chosen uniformly at random.5 A scheme which guarantees privacy against T colluding workers is called T -private. 6
More concretely, given any subset of workers that return the computing results (denoted by K), the master computes
(Yˆ1, ..., YˆK) = hK({Y˜i}i∈K), where each hK is a deterministic function (or is random but independent of both the encoding
functions and input data). We refer to the hK’s as decoding functions.7 We say that a scheme is S-resilient, A-secure, and
T -private if the master always returns the correct results (i.e., each Yi = Yˆi), and all above requirements are satisfied.
Given the above framework, we aim to characterize the region for (S,A, T ), such that an S-resilient, A-secure, and T -private
scheme can be found, given parameters N , K, and function f , for any sufficiently large field F.
This framework encapsulates many computation tasks of interest, which we highlight as follows.
Linear computation. Consider a scenario where the goal is to compute A~b for some dataset A = {Ai}Ki=1 and vector ~b,
which naturally arises in many machine learning algorithms, such as each iteration of linear regression. Our formulation covers
this by letting V be the space of matrices of certain dimensions over F, U be the space of vectors of a certain length over F,
Xi be Ai, and f(Xi) = Xi ·~b for all i ∈ [K]. Coded computing for such linear computations has also been studied in [9],
[12], [21], [28], [29].
Bilinear computation. Another computation task of interest is to evaluate element-wise products {Ai · Bi}Ki=1 of two
lists of matrices {Ai}Ki=1 and {Bi}Ki=1. This is the key building block for various algorithms, such as fast distributed matrix
multiplication [30]. Our formulation covers this by letting V be the space of pairs of two matrices of certain dimensions, U be
the space of matrices of dimension which equals that of the product of the pairs of matrices, Xi = (Ai, Bi), and f(Xi) = Ai ·Bi
for all i ∈ [K].
General tensor algebra. Beyond bilinear operations, distributed computations of multivariate polynomials of larger degree,
such as general tensor algebraic functions (i.e. functions composed of inner products, outer products, and tensor contractions)
[31], also arise in practice. A specific example is to compute the coordinate transformation of a third-order tensor field at
K locations, where given a list of matrices {Q(i)}Ki=1 and a list of third-order tensors {T (i)}Ki=1 with matching dimension
on each index, the goal is to compute another list of tensors, denoted by {T ′(i)}Ki=1, of which each entry is defined as
T
′(i)
j′k′`′ ,
∑
j,k,`
T
′(i)
jk`Q
(i)
jj′Q
(i)
kk′Q
(i)
``′ . Our formulation covers all functions within this class by letting V be the space of input
tensors, U be the space of output tensors, Xi be the inputs, and f be the tensor function. These computations are not studied
by state-of-the-art coded computing frameworks.
Gradient computation. Another general class of functions arises from gradient decent algorithms and their variants, which
are the workhorse of today’s learning tasks [32]. The computation task for this class of functions is to consider one iteration
of the gradient decent algorithm, and to evaluate the gradient of the empirical risk ∇LS(h) , avgz∈S ∇`h(z), given a
hypothesis h : Rd → R, a respective loss function `h : Rd+1 → R, and a training set S ⊆ Rd+1, where d is the number of
features. In practice, this computation is carried out by partitioning S into K subsets {Si}Ki=1 of equal sizes, evaluating the
partial gradients {∇LSi(h)}Ki=1 distributedly, and computing the final result using ∇LS(h) = avgi∈[K]∇LSi(h). We present a
specific example of applying this computing model to least-squares regression problems in Section VI.
3The total degree of a polynomial f is the maximum among all the total degrees of its monomials. When discussing finite F, we resort to the canonical
representation of polynomials, in which the individual degree within each term is no more than (|F| − 1).
4A formal definition is provided in Section V.
5Equivalently, it requires that X˜T and X are independent. Under this condition, the input data X still appears uniformly random after the colluding workers
learn X˜T , which guarantees the privacy.
6To guarantee that the privacy requirement is well defined, we assume that F and V are finite whenever T > 0.
7Similar to encoding, we also require the decoding function to have low complexity. When there is no adversary (A = 0), we restrict our attention to linear
decoding schemes.
4III. MAIN RESULTS AND PRIOR WORKS
We now state our main results and discuss their connections with prior works. Our first theorem characterizes the region for
(S,A, T ) that LCC achieves (i.e., the set of all feasible S-resilient, A-secure, and T -private schemes via LCC as defined in the
previos section).
Theorem 1. Given a number of workers N and a dataset X = (X1, . . . , XK), LCC provides an S-resilient, A-secure,
and T -private scheme for computing {f(Xi)}Ki=1 for any polynomial f , as long as
(K + T − 1) deg f + S + 2A+ 1 ≤ N. (1)
Remark 1. To prove Theorem 1, we formally present LCC in Section IV, which achieves the stated resiliency, security, and
privacy. The key idea is to encode the input dataset using the well-known Lagrange polynomial. In particular, encoding functions
(i.e., gi’s) in LCC amount to evaluations of a Lagrange polynomial of degree K−1 at N distinct points. Hence, computations at
the workers amount to evaluations of a composition of that polynomial with the desired function f . Therefore, inequality (1) may
simply be seen as the number of evaluations that are necessary and sufficient in order to interpolate the composed polynomial,
which is later evaluated at a certain point to finalize the computation. LCC also has a number of additional properties of
interest. First, the proposed encoding is identical for all computations f , which allows pre-encoding of the data without knowing
the identity of the computing task (i.e., universality). Second, decoding and encoding rely on polynomial interpolation and
evaluation, and hence efficient off-the-shelf subroutines can be used.8
Remark 2. Besides the coding approach presented to achieve Theorem 1, a variation of LCC can be used to achieve any
(S,A, T ) as long as K(S + 2A+ deg f · T + 1) ≤ N . This scheme (presented in Appendix D) achieves an improved region
when N < Kdegf − 1 and T = 0, where it recovers the uncoded repetition scheme. For brevity, we refer the better of these
two scheme as LCC when presenting optimality results (i.e., Theorem 2).
Remark 3. Note that LHS of inequality (1) is independent of the number of workers N , hence the key property of LCC is that
adding 1 worker can increase its resilience to stragglers by 1 or its security to malicious servers by 1/2, while keeping the
privacy constraint T the same. Note that using an uncoded replication based approach, to increase the resiliency to stragglers
by 1, one needs to essentially repeat each computation once more (i.e., requiring K more machines as opposed to 1 machine in
LCC). This result essentially extends the well-known optimal scaling of error-correcting codes (i.e., adding one parity can
provide robustness against one erasure or 1/2 error in optimal maximum distance separable codes) to the distributed computing
paradigm.
Our next theorem demonstrates the optimality of LCC.
Theorem 2. LCC achieves the optimal trade-off between resiliency, security, and privacy (i.e., achieving the largest region
of (S,A,T)) for any multilinear function f among all computing schemes that uses linear encoding, for all problem scenarios.
Moreover, when focusing on the case where no security constraint is imposed, LCC is optimal for any polynomial f among all
schemes with additional constraints of linear decoding and sufficiently large (or zero) characteristic of F.
Remark 4. Theorem 2 is proved in Section V. The main proof idea is to show that any computing strategy that outperforms LCC
would violate the decodability requirement, by finding two instances of the computation process where the same intermediate
computing results correspond to different output values.
Remark 5. In addition to the result we show in Theorem 2, we can also prove that LCC achieves optimality in terms of the
amount of randomness used in data encoding. Specifically, we show in Appendix I that LCC requires injecting the minimum
amount of randomness, among all computing schemes that universally achieve the same resiliency-security-privacy tradeoff for
all linear functions f .
We conclude this section by discussing several lines of related work in the literature and contrasting them with LCC.
A. LCC vs. Prior Works
The study of coding theoretic techniques for accelerating large scale distributed tasks (a.k.a. coded computing) was initiated
in [17], [18], [20]. Following works focused largely on matrix-vector and matrix-matrix multiplication (e.g., [21]–[23], [30]),
gradient computation in gradient descent algorithms (e.g., [10], [13], [15]), communication reduction via coding (e.g., [33]–[36]),
and secure and private computing (e.g., [24], [25]).
LCC recovers several previously studied results as special cases. For example, setting f to be the identity function and V = U
reduces to the well-studied case of distributed storage, in which Theorem 1 is well known (e.g., the Singleton bound [37,
Thm. 4.1]). Further, as previously mentioned, f can correspond to matrix-vector and matrix-matrix multiplication, in which the
special cases of Theorem 1 are known as well [9], [30].
More importantly, LCC improves and generalizes these works on coded computing in a few aspects: Generality–LCC
significantly generalizes prior works to go beyond linear and bilinear computations that have so far been the main focus in
8A more detailed discussion on the coding complexities of LCC can be found in Appendix B.
5BGW LCC
Complexity
per worker K 1
Frac. data
per worker 1 1/K
Randomness KT T
Min. num.
of workers deg(f)(T + 1) deg(f)(K + T − 1) + 1
Table I
COMPARISON BETWEEN BGW BASED DESIGNS AND LCC. THE COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY IS NORMALIZED BY THAT OF EVALUATING f ;
RANDOMNESS, WHICH REFERS TO THE NUMBER OF RANDOM ENTRIES USED IN ENCODING FUNCTIONS, IS NORMALIZED BY THE LENGTH OF Xi .
this area, and can be applied to arbitrary multivariate polynomial computations that arise in machine learning applications. In
fact, many specific computations considered in the past can be seen as special cases of polynomial computation. This includes
matrix-vector multiplication, matrix-matrix multiplication, and gradient computation whenever the loss function at hand is a
polynomial, or is approximated by one. Universality–once the data has been coded, any polynomial up to a certain degree
can be computed distributedly via LCC. In other words, data encoding of LCC can be universally used for any polynomial
computation. This is in stark contrast to previous task specific coding techniques in the literature. Furthermore, workers apply
the same computation as if no coding took place; a feature that reduces computational costs, and prevents ordinary servers
from carrying the burden of outliers. Security and Privacy–other than a handful of works discussed above, straggler mitigation
(i.e., resiliency) has been the primary focus of the coded computing literature. This work extends the application of coded
computing to secure and private computing for general polynomial computations.
Providing security and privacy for multiparty computing (MPC) and Machine Learning systems is an extensively studied topic
which addresses a problem setting similar to LCC. To illustrate the significant role of LCC in secure and private computing, let
us consider the celebrated BGW MPC scheme [26]. 9
Given inputs {Xi}Ki=1, BGW first uses Shamir’s scheme [38] to encode the dataset in a privacy-preserving manner as Pi(z) =
Xi+Zi,1z+ . . .+Zi,T z
T for every i ∈ [K], where Zi,j’s are i.i.d uniformly random variables and T is the number of colluding
workers that should be tolerated. The key distinction between the data encoding of BGW scheme and LCC is that we instead
use Lagrange polynomials to encode the data. This results in significant reduction in the amount of randomness needed in data
encoding (BGW needs KT zi,j’s while as we describe in the next section, LCC only needs T amount of randomness).
The BGW scheme will then store {Pi(α`)}i∈[K] to worker ` for every ` ∈ [N ], given some distinct values α1, . . . , αN . The
computation is then carried out by evaluating f over all stored coded data at the nodes. In the LCC scheme, on the other hand,
each worker ` only needs to store one encoded data (X˜`) and compute f(X˜`). This gives rise to the second key advantage of
LCC, which is a factor of K in storage overhead and computation complexity at each worker.
After computation, each worker ` in the BGW scheme has essentially evaluated the polynomials {f(Pi(z))}Ki=1 at z = α`,
whose degree is at most deg(f) · T . Hence, if no straggler or adversary appears (i.e, S = A = 0), the master can recover
all required results f(Pi(0))’s, through polynomial interpolation, as long as N ≥ deg(f) · T + 1 workers participated in the
computation10. Note that under the same condition, LCC scheme requires N ≥ deg(f) · (K + T − 1) + 1 number of workers,
which is larger than that of the BGW scheme.
Hence, in overall comparison with the BGW scheme, LCC results in a factor of K reduction in the amount of randomness,
storage overhead, and computation complexity, while requiring more workers to guarantee the same level of privacy. This is
summarized in Table I.11
Recently, [24] has also combined ideas from the BGW scheme and [22] to form polynomial sharing, a private coded
computation scheme for arbitrary matrix polynomials. However, polynomial sharing inherits the undesired BGW property
of performing a communication round for every bilinear operation in the polynomial; a feature that drastically increases
communication overhead, and is circumvented by the one-shot approach of LCC. DRACO [25] is also recently proposed as a
secure computation scheme for gradients. Yet, DRACO employs a blackbox approach, i.e., the resulting gradients are encoded
rather than the data itself, and the inherent algebraic structure of the gradients is ignored. For this approach, [25] shows that
a 2A+ 1 multiplicative factor of redundant computations is necessary. In LCC however, the blackbox approach is disregarded
in favor of an algebraic one, and consequently, a 2A additive factor suffices.
LCC has also been recently applied to several applications in which security and privacy in computations are critical. For
example, in [39], LCC has been applied to enable a scalable and secure approach to sharding in blockchain systems. Also,
in [40], a privacy-preserving approach for machine learning has been developed that leverages LCC to provides substantial
speedups over cyrptographic approaches that relay on MPC.
9Conventionally, the BGW scheme operates in a multi-round fashion, requiring significantly more communication overhead than one-shot approaches. For
simplicity of comparison, we present a modified one-shot version of BGW.
10It is also possible to use the conventional multi-round BGW, which only requires N ≥ 2T + 1 workers to ensure T -privacy. However, multiple rounds of
computation and communication (Ω(log deg(f)) rounds) are needed, which further increases its communication overhead.
11A BGW scheme was also proposed in [26] for secure MPC, however for a substantially different setting. Similarly, a comparison can be made by adapting
it to our setting, leading to similar results, which we omit for brevity.
6IV. LAGRANGE CODED COMPUTING
In this Section we prove Theorem 1 by presenting LCC and characterizing the region for (S,A, T ) that it achieves.12 We
start with an example to illustrate the key components of LCC.
A. Illustrating Example
Consider the function f(Xi) = X2i , where input Xi’s are
√
M ×√M square matrices for some square integer M . We
demonstrate LCC in the scenario where the input data X is partitioned into K = 2 batches X1 and X2, and the computing system
has N = 8 workers. In addition, the suggested scheme is 1-resilient, 1-secure, and 1-private (i.e., achieves (S,A, T ) = (1, 1, 1)).
The gist of LCC is picking a uniformly random matrix Z, and encoding (X1, X2, Z) using a Lagrange interpolation
polynomial:13
u(z) ,X1 · (z − 2)(z − 3)
(1− 2)(1− 3) +X2 ·
(z − 1)(z − 3)
(2− 1)(2− 3)+
Z · (z − 1)(z − 2)
(3− 1)(3− 2) .
We then fix distinct {αi}8i=1 in F such that {αi}8i=1 ∩ [2] = ∅, and let workers 1, . . . , 8 store u(α1), . . . , u(α8).
First, note that for every j ∈ [8], worker j sees X˜j , a linear combination of X1 and X2 that is masked by addition of λ · Z
for some nonzero λ ∈ F11; since Z is uniformly random, this guarantees perfect privacy for T = 1. Next, note that worker j
computes f(X˜j) = f(u(αj)), which is an evaluation of the composition polynomial f(u(z)), whose degree is at most 4, at αj .
Normally, a polynomial of degree 4 can be interpolated from 5 evaluations at distinct points. However, the presence of A = 1
adversary and S = 1 straggler requires the master to employ a Reed-Solomon decoder, and have three additional evaluations at
distinct points (in general, two additional evaluations for every adversary and one for every straggler). Finally, after decoding
polynomial f(u(z)), the master can obtain f(X1) and f(X2) by evaluating it at z = 1 and z = 2.
B. General Description
Similar to Subsection IV-A, we select any K + T distinct elements β1, . . . , βK+T from F, and find a polynomial u : F→ V
of degree at most K + T − 1 such that u(βi) = Xi for any i ∈ [K], and u(βi) = Zi for i ∈ {K + 1, . . . ,K + T}, where
all Zi’s are chosen uniformly at random from V. This is simply accomplished by letting u be the Lagrange interpolation
polynomial
u(z) ,
∑
j∈[K]
Xj ·
∏
k∈[K+T ]\{j}
z − βk
βj − βk+
K+T∑
j=K+1
Zj ·
∏
k∈[K+T ]\{j}
z − βk
βj − βk .
We then select N distinct elements {αi}i∈[N ] from F such that {αi}i∈[N ] ∩ {βj}j∈[K] = ∅ (this requirement is alleviated
if T = 0), and let X˜i = u(αi) for any i ∈ [N ]. That is, the input variables are encoded as
X˜i=u(αi)=(X1, . . . , XK , ZK+1, . . . , ZK+T ) · Ui, (2)
where U ∈ F(K+T )×Nq is the encoding matrix Ui,j ,
∏
`∈[K+T ]\{i}
αj−β`
βi−β` , and Ui is its i’th column.
14
Following the above encoding, each worker i applies f on X˜i and sends the result back to the master. Hence, the master
obtains N−S evaluations, at most A of which are incorrect, of the polynomial f(u(z)). Since deg(f(u(z))) ≤ deg(f)·(K+T−1),
and N ≥ (K + T − 1) deg(f) + S + 2A + 1, the master can obtain all coefficients of f(u(z)) by applying Reed-Solomon
decoding. Having this polynomial, the master evaluates it at βi for every i ∈ [K] to obtain f(u(βi)) = f(Xi), and hence we
have shown that the above scheme is S-resilient and A-secure.
As for the T -privacy guarantee of the above scheme, our proof relies on the fact that the bottom T ×N submatrix U bottom
of U is an MDS matrix (i.e., every T × T submatrix of U bottom is invertible, see Lemma 2 in the supplementary material).
Hence, for a colluding set of workers T ⊆ [N ] of size T , their encoded data X˜T satisfies X˜T = XU topT + ZU bottomT ,
where Z , (ZK+1, . . . , ZK+T ), and U topT ∈ FK×Tq , U bottomT ∈ FT×Tq are the top and bottom submatrices which correspond to
the columns in U that are indexed by T . Now, the fact that any U bottomT is invertible implies that the random padding added for
these colluding workers is uniformly random, which completely masks the coded data XU topT . This directly guarantees T -privacy.
12For an algorithmic illustration, see Appendix A.
13Assume that F is a finite field with 11 elements.
14By selecting the values of αi’s differently, we can recover the uncoded repetition scheme, see Appendix D.
7V. OPTIMALITY OF LCC
In this section, we provide a layout for the proof of optimality for LCC (i.e., Theorem 2). Formally, we define that a linear
encoding function is one that computes a linear combination of the input variables (and possibly a list of independent uniformly
random keys when privacy is taken into account15); while a linear decoding function computes a linear combination of workers’
output. We essentially need to prove that (a) given any multilinear f , any linear encoding scheme that achieves any (S,A, T )
requires at least N ≥ (K + T − 1) deg f + S + 2A+ 1 workers when T > 0 or N ≥ Kdeg f − 1, and N ≥ K(S + 2A+ 1)
workers in other cases; (b) for a general polynomial f , any scheme that uses linear encoding and decoding requires at least the
same number of workers, if the characteristic of F is 0 or greater than deg f .
The proof rely on the following key lemma, which characterizes the recovery threshold of any encoding scheme, defined as
the minimum number of workers that the master needs to wait to guarantee decodability.
Lemma 1. Given any multilinear f , the recovery threshold of any valid linear encoding scheme, denoted by R, satisfies
R ≥RLCC(N,K, f) ,
min{(K − 1) deg f + 1, N − bN/Kc+ 1}. (3)
Moreover, if the encoding scheme is T private, we have R ≥ RLCC(N,K, f) + T · deg f .
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix E, by constructing instances of the computation process for any assumed
scheme that achieves smaller recovery threshold, and proving that such scheme fails to achieve decodability in these instances.
Intuitively, note that the recovery threshold is exactly the difference between N and the number of stragglers that can be
tolerated, inequality (3) in fact proves that LCC (described in Section IV and Appendix G) achieves the optimum resiliency, as
it exactly achieves the stated recovery threshold. Similarly, one can verify that Lemma 1 essentially states that LCC achieves
the optimal tradeoff between resiliency and privacy.
Assuming the correctness of Lemma 1, the two parts of Theorem 2 can be proved as follows. To prove part (a) of the
converses, we need to extend Lemma 1 to also take adversaries into account. This is achieved by using an extended concept
of Hamming distance, defined in [30] for coded computing. Part (b) requires generalizing Lemma 1 to arbitrary polynomial
functions, which is proved by showing that for any f that achieves any (S, T ) pair, there exists a multilinear function with the
same degree for which a computation scheme can be found to achieves the same requirement. The detailed proofs can be found
in Appendices F and G respectively.
VI. APPLICATION TO LINEAR REGRESSION AND EXPERIMENTS ON AWS EC2
In this section we demonstrate a practical application of LCC in accelerating distributed linear regression, whose gradient
computation is a quadratic function of the input dataset, hence matching well the LCC framework. We also experimentally
demonstrate its performance gain over state of the arts via experiments on AWS EC2 clusters.
Applying LCC for linear regression. Given a feature matrix X ∈ Rm×d containing m data points of d features, and a
label vector y ∈ Rm, a linear regression problem aims to find the weight vector w ∈ Rd that minimizes the loss ||Xw − y||2.
Gradient descent (GD) solves this problem by iteratively moving the weight along the negative gradient direction, which is in
iteration-t computed as 2X>(Xw(t) − y).
To run GD distributedly over a system comprising a master node and n worker nodes, we first partition X = [X1 · · ·Xn]>
into n sub-matrices. Each worker stores r coded sub-matrices generated from linearly combining Xjs, for some parameter
1 ≤ r ≤ n. Given the current weight w, each worker performs computation using its local storage, and sends the result to
the master. Master recovers X>Xw =
∑n
j=1XjX
>
j w using the results from a subset of fastest workers.
16 To measure
performance of any linear regression scheme, we consider the metric recovery threshold (denoted by R), defined as the minimum
number of workers the master needs to wait for, to guarantee decodability (i.e., tolerating the remaining stragglers).
We cast this gradient computation to the computing model in Section II, by grouping the sub-matrices into K=dnr e
blocks such that X = [X¯1 · · · X¯K ]>. Then computing XX>w reduces to computing the sum of a degree-2 polynomial
f(X¯k) = X¯kX¯
>
k w, evaluated over X¯1, . . . , X¯K . Now, we can use LCC to decide on the coded storage as in (2), and achieve
a recovery threshold of RLCC = 2(K − 1) + 1 = 2dnr e − 1 (Theorem 1).17
Comparisons with state of the arts. The conventional uncoded scheme picks r = 1, and has each worker j compute XjX>j w.
Master needs result from each work, yielding a recovery threshold of Runcoded = n. By redundantly storing/processing r > 1
uncoded sub-matrices at each worker, the “gradient coding” (GC) methods [10], [14], [15] code across partial gradients computed
from uncoded data, and reduce the recovery threshold to RGC = n− r + 1. An alternative “matrix-vector multiplication based”
(MVM) approach [17] requires two rounds of computation. In the first round, an intermediate vector z = Xw is computed
distributedly, which is re-distributed to the workers in the second round for them to collaboratively compute X>z. Each
15This is well defined as we assumed that V is finite when T > 0.
16Since the value of X>y does not vary across iterations, it only needs to be computed once. We assume that it is available at the master for weight updates.
17This recovery threshold is also optimum within a factor of 2, as we proved in Appendix J.
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Figure 2. Run-time comparison of LCC with other three schemes: conventional uncoded, GC, and MVM.
worker stores coded data generated using MDS codes from X and X> respectively. MVM achieves a recovery threshold of
RMVM = d 2nr e in each round, when the storage is evenly split between rounds.
Compared with GC, LCC codes directly on data, and reduces the recovery threshold by about r/2 times. While the amount
of computation and communication at each worker is the same for GC and LCC, LCC is expected to finish much faster due to
its much smaller recovery threshold. Compared with MVM, LCC achieves a smaller recovery threshold than that in each round
of MVM (assuming even storage split). While each MVM worker performs less computation in each iteration, it sends two
vectors whose sizes are respectively proportional to m and d, whereas each LCC worker only sends one dimension-d vector.
We run linear regression on AWS EC2 using Nesterov’s accelerated gradient descent, where all nodes are implemented
on t2.micro instances. We generate synthetic datasets of m data points, by 1) randomly sampling a true weight w∗, 2)
randomly sampling each input xi of d features and computing its output yi = x>i w
∗. For each dataset, we run GD for 100
iterations over n = 40 workers. We consider different dimensions of input matrix X as listed in the following scenarios.
• Scenario 1 & 2: (m, d) = (8000, 7000).
• Scenario 3: (m, d) = (160000, 500).
We let the system run with naturally occurring stragglers in scenario 1. To mimic the effect of slow/failed workers, we
artificially introduce stragglers in scenarios 2 and 3, by imposing a 0.5 seconds delay on each worker with probability 5% in
each iteration.
To implement LCC, we set the βi parameters to 1, ..., nr , and the αi parameters to 0, . . . , n− 1. To avoid numerical instability
due to large entries of the decoding matrix, we can embed input data into a large finite field, and apply LCC in it with exact
computations. However in all of our experiments the gradients are calculated correctly without carrying out this step.
Results. For GC and LCC, we optimize the total run-time over r subject to local memory size. For MVM, we further
optimize the run-time over the storage assigned between two rounds of matrix-vector multiplications. We plot the measured
run-times in Figure 2, and list the detailed breakdowns of all scenarios in Appendix K.
We draw the following conclusions from experiments.
• LCC achieves the least run-time in all scenarios. In particular, LCC speeds up the uncoded scheme by 6.79×-13.43×, the
GC scheme by 2.36-4.29×, and the MVM scheme by 1.01-12.65×.
• In scenarios 1 & 2 where the number of inputs m is close to the number of features d, LCC achieves a similar performance
as MVM. However, when we have much more data points in scenario 3, LCC finishes substantially faster than MVM by
as much as 12.65×. The main reason for this subpar performance is that MVM requires large amounts of data transfer
from workers to the master in the first round and from master to workers in the second round (both are proportional to m).
However, the amount of communication from each worker or master is proportional to d for all other schemes, which is
much smaller than m in scenario 3.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This material is based upon work supported by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract
No. HR001117C0053, ARO award W911NF1810400, NSF grants CCF-1703575, ONR Award No. N00014-16-1-2189, and
CCF-1763673. The views, opinions, and/or findings expressed are those of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as
representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. M. Soltanolkotabi is supported
by the Packard Fellowship in Science and Engineering, a Sloan Research Fellowship in Mathematics, an NSF-CAREER
under award #1846369, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research Young Investigator Program (AFOSR-YIP) under award
#FA9550-18-1-0078, an NSF-CIF award #1813877, and a Google faculty research award. Qian Yu is supported by the Google
PhD Fellowship.
9REFERENCES
[1] M. Abadi, P. Barham, J. Chen, Z. Chen, A. Davis, J. Dean, M. Devin, S. Ghemawat, G. Irving, M. Isard, et al., “Tensorflow: A system for large-scale
machine learning.,” in OSDI, vol. 16, pp. 265–283, 2016.
[2] J. Dean and L. A. Barroso, “The tail at scale,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 74–80, 2013.
[3] M. Li, D. G. Andersen, A. Smola, and K. Yu, “Communication efficient distributed machine learning with the parameter server,” in Proceedings of the
27th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems - Volume 1, NIPS’14, (Cambridge, MA, USA), pp. 19–27, MIT Press, 2014.
[4] N. J. Yadwadkar, B. Hariharan, J. E. Gonzalez, and R. Katz, “Multi-task learning for straggler avoiding predictive job scheduling,” Journal of Machine
Learning Research, vol. 17, no. 106, pp. 1–37, 2016.
[5] M. Li, D. G. Andersen, A. J. Smola, and K. Yu, “Communication efficient distributed machine learning with the parameter server,” in Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, pp. 19–27, 2014.
[6] P. Blanchard, R. Guerraoui, J. Stainer, et al., “Machine learning with adversaries: Byzantine tolerant gradient descent,” in Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pp. 118–128, 2017.
[7] R. Cramer, I. B. Damgrd, and J. B. Nielsen, Secure Multiparty Computation and Secret Sharing. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press,
1st ed., 2015.
[8] D. Bogdanov, S. Laur, and J. Willemson, “Sharemind: A framework for fast privacy-preserving computations,” in Proceedings of the 13th European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security, ESORICS ’08, (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 192–206, Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[9] K. Lee, M. Lam, R. Pedarsani, D. Papailiopoulos, and K. Ramchandran, “Speeding up distributed machine learning using codes,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 64, pp. 1514–1529, March 2018.
[10] R. Tandon, Q. Lei, A. G. Dimakis, and N. Karampatziakis, “Gradient coding: Avoiding stragglers in distributed learning,” in Proceedings of the 34th
International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2017, Sydney, NSW, Australia, 6-11 August 2017, pp. 3368–3376, 2017.
[11] R. K. Maity, A. S. Rawat, and A. Mazumdar, “Robust gradient descent via moment encoding with ldpc codes,” SysML Conference, 2018.
[12] C. Karakus, Y. Sun, S. Diggavi, and W. Yin, “Straggler mitigation in distributed optimization through data encoding,” in Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pp. 5440–5448, 2017.
[13] S. Li, S. M. M. Kalan, A. S. Avestimehr, and M. Soltanolkotabi, “Near-optimal straggler mitigation for distributed gradient methods,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.09990, 2017.
[14] W. Halbawi, N. A. Ruhi, F. Salehi, and B. Hassibi, “Improving distributed gradient descent using reed-solomon codes,” CoRR, vol. abs/1706.05436, 2017.
[15] N. Raviv, I. Tamo, R. Tandon, and A. G. Dimakis, “Gradient coding from cyclic mds codes and expander graphs,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.03858, 2017.
[16] M. Ye and E. Abbe, “Communication-computation efficient gradient coding,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.03475, 2018.
[17] K. Lee, M. Lam, R. Pedarsani, D. Papailiopoulos, and K. Ramchandran, “Speeding up distributed machine learning using codes,” NIPS Workshop on
Machine Learning Systems, Dec. 2015.
[18] S. Li, M. A. Maddah-Ali, and A. S. Avestimehr, “Coded MapReduce,” in Proceedings of the 2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control, and Computing (Allerton), pp. 964–971, Sept. 2015.
[19] Q. Yu, S. Li, M. A. Maddah-Ali, and A. S. Avestimehr, “How to optimally allocate resources for coded distributed computing?,” in 2017 IEEE International
Conference on Communications (ICC), pp. 1–7, May 2017.
[20] S. Li, M. A. Maddah-Ali, Q. Yu, and A. S. Avestimehr, “A fundamental tradeoff between computation and communication in distributed computing,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 109–128, 2018.
[21] S. Dutta, V. Cadambe, and P. Grover, “Short-dot: Computing large linear transforms distributedly using coded short dot products,” in Advances In Neural
Information Processing Systems, pp. 2092–2100, 2016.
[22] Q. Yu, M. Maddah-Ali, and S. Avestimehr, “Polynomial codes: an optimal design for high-dimensional coded matrix multiplication,” in Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 30, pp. 4406–4416, Curran Associates, Inc., 2017.
[23] S. Dutta, M. Fahim, F. Haddadpour, H. Jeong, V. R. Cadambe, and P. Grover, “On the optimal recovery threshold of coded matrix multiplication,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1801.10292, 2018.
[24] H. A. Nodehi and M. A. Maddah-Ali, “Limited-sharing multi-party computation for massive matrix operations,” in 2018 IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory (ISIT), pp. 1231–1235, June 2018.
[25] L. Chen, Z. Charles, D. Papailiopoulos, et al., “Draco: Robust distributed training via redundant gradients,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.09877, 2018.
[26] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, “Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation,” in Proceedings of
the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp. 1–10, ACM, 1988.
[27] P. Mohassel and Y. Zhang, “Secureml: A system for scalable privacy-preserving machine learning,” in 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP), vol. 00, pp. 19–38, May 2017.
[28] R. Bitar, P. Parag, and S. E. Rouayheb, “Minimizing latency for secure coded computing using secret sharing via staircase codes,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.02640, 2018.
[29] S. Wang, J. Liu, N. Shroff, and P. Yang, “Fundamental limits of coded linear transform,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.09791, 2018.
[30] Q. Yu, M. A. Maddah-Ali, and A. S. Avestimehr, “Straggler mitigation in distributed matrix multiplication: Fundamental limits and optimal coding,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.07487, 2018.
[31] P. Renteln, Manifolds, Tensors, and Forms: An Introduction for Mathematicians and Physicists. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[32] S. Shalev-Shwartz and S. Ben-David, Understanding machine learning: From theory to algorithms. Cambridge university press, 2014.
[33] S. Li, S. Supittayapornpong, M. A. Maddah-Ali, and S. Avestimehr, “Coded terasort,” IPDPSW, 2017.
[34] Y. H. Ezzeldin, M. Karmoose, and C. Fragouli, “Communication vs distributed computation: an alternative trade-off curve,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.08966,
2017.
[35] S. Prakash, A. Reisizadeh, R. Pedarsani, and S. Avestimehr, “Coded computing for distributed graph analytics,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.05522, 2018.
[36] K. Konstantinidis and A. Ramamoorthy, “Leveraging Coding Techniques for Speeding up Distributed Computing,” ArXiv e-prints, 2018.
[37] R. Roth, Introduction to coding theory. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[38] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Commun. ACM, vol. 22, pp. 612–613, Nov. 1979.
[39] S. Li, M. Yu, S. Avestimehr, S. Kannan, and P. Viswanath, “Polyshard: Coded sharding achieves linearly scaling efficiency and security simultaneously,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.10361, 2018.
[40] J. So, B. Guler, A. S. Avestimehr, and P. Mohassel, “Codedprivateml: A fast and privacy-preserving framework for distributed machine learning,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1902.00641, 2019.
[41] K. S. Kedlaya and C. Umans, “Fast polynomial factorization and modular composition,” SIAM Journal on Computing, vol. 40, no. 6, pp. 1767–1802,
2011.
[42] E. Berlekamp, “Nonbinary bch decoding (abstr.),” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 14, pp. 242–242, March 1968.
[43] J. Massey, “Shift-register synthesis and bch decoding,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 15, pp. 122–127, January 1969.
[44] M. Sudan, “Notes on an efficient solution to the rational function interpolation problem,” Avaliable from http://people.csail.mit.edu/madhu/FT01/notes/
rational.ps, 1999.
[45] M. Rosenblum, “A fast algorithm for rational function approximations,” Avaliable from http://people.csail.mit.edu/madhu/FT01/notes/ rosenblum.ps, 1999.
[46] V. Y. Pan, “Matrix structures of vandermonde and cauchy types and polynomial and rational computations,” in Structured Matrices and Polynomials,
pp. 73–116, Springer, 2001.
10
[47] W. Huang, Coding for Security and Reliability in Distributed Systems. PhD thesis, California Institute of Technology, 2017.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A. Algorithmic Illustration of LCC
Algorithm 1 LCC Encoding (Precomputation)
1: procedure ENCODE(X1, X2, ..., XK , T ) . Encode inputs variables according to LCC
2: generate uniform random variables ZK+1, ..., ZK+T
3: jointly compute X˜i ←
∑
j∈[K]Xj ·
∏
k∈[K+T ]\{j}
αi−βk
βj−βk +
∑K+T
j=K+1 Zj ·
∏
k∈[K+T ]\{j}
αi−βk
βj−βk for i = 1, 2, ..., N
using fast polynomial interpolation
4: return X˜1, ..., X˜N . The coded variable assigned to worker i is X˜i
5: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Computation Stage
1: procedure WORKERCOMPUTATION(X˜) . Each worker i takes X˜i as input
2: return f(X˜) . Compute as if no coding is taking place
3: end procedure
1: procedure DECODE(S,A) . Executed by master
2: wait for a subset of fastest N − S workers
3: N ← identities of the fastest workers
4: {Y˜i}i∈N ← results from the fastest workers
5: recover Y1, ..., YK from {Y˜i}i∈N using fast interpolation or Reed-Solomon decoding . See Appendix B
6: return Y1, ..., YK
7: end procedure
β1, . . . , βK+T and α1, ..., αN are global constants in F, satisfying18
1) βi’s are distinct,
2) αi’s are distinct,
3) {αi}i∈[N ] ∩ {βj}j∈[K] = ∅ (this requirement is alleviated if T = 0).
B. Coding Complexities of LCC
By exploiting the algebraic structure of LCC, we can find efficient encoding and decoding algorithms with almost linear
computational complexities. The encoding of LCC can be viewed as interpolating degree K + T − 1 polynomials, and then
evaluating them at N points. It is known that both operations only require almost linear complexities: interpolating a polynomial
of degree k has a complexity of O(k log2 k log log k), and evaluating it at any k points requires the same [41]. Hence, the total
encoding complexity of LCC is at most O(N log2(K + T ) log log(K + T ) dimV), which is almost linear to the output size of
the encoder O(N dimV).
Similarly, when no security requirement is imposed on the system (i.e., A = 0), the decoding of LCC can also be completed
using polynomial interpolation and evaluation. An almost linear complexity O(R log2R log logR dimU) can be achieved,
where R denotes the recovery threshold.
A less trivial case is to consider the decoding algorithm when A > 0, where the goal is essentially to interpolate a polynomial
with at most A erroneous input evaluations, or decoding a Reed-Solomon code. An almost linear time complexity can be
achieved using additional techniques developed in [42]–[45]. Specifically, the following 2A− 1 syndrome variables can be
computed with a complexity of O((N −S) log2(N −S) log log(N −S) dimU) using fast algorithms for polynomial evaluation
and for transposed-Vandermonde-matrix multiplication [46].
Sk ,
∑
i∈N
Y˜iα
k
i∏
j∈N\{i}(αi − αj)
∀k ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2A− 1}. (4)
According to [42], [43], the location of the errors (i.e., the identities of adversaries in LCC decoding) can be determined
given these syndrome variables by computing its rational function approximation. Almost linear time algorithms for this
operation are provided in [44], [45], which only requires a complexity of O(A log2A log logA dimU). After identifying the
adversaries, the final results can be computed similar to the A = 0 case. This approach achieves a total decoding complexity
18A variation of LCC is presented in Appendix D, by selecting different values of αi’s.
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of O((N − S) log2(N − S) log log(N − S) dimU), which is almost linear with respect to the input size of the decoder
O((N − S) dimU).
Finally, note that the adversaries can only affect a fixed subset of A workers’ results for all entries. This decoding time can
be further reduced by computing the final outputs entry-wise: for each iteration, ignore computing results from adversaries
identified in earlier steps, and proceed decoding with the rest of the results.
C. The MDS property of U bottom
Lemma 2. The matrix U bottom is an MDS matrix.
Proof. First, let V ∈ FT×N be
Vi,j =
∏
`∈[T ]\{i}
αj − β`+K
βi+K − β`+K .
It follows from the resiliency property of LCC that by having (X˜1, . . . , X˜N ) = (X1, . . . , XT ) · V , the master can obtain the
values of X1, . . . , XT from any T of the X˜i’s. This is one of the alternative definitions for an MDS code, and hence, V is an
MDS matrix.
To show that U bottom is an MDS matrix, it is shown that U bottom can be obtained from V by multiplying rows and columns
by nonzero scalars. Let [T : K] , {T + 1, T + 2, . . . , T +K}, and notice that for (s, r) ∈ [T ]× [N ], entry (s, r) of U bottom
can be written as ∏
t∈[K+T ]\{s+K}
αr − βt
βs+K − βt =
∏
t∈[K]
αr − βt
βs+K − βt ·∏
t∈[K:T ]\{s+K}
αr − βt
βs+K − βt .
Hence, U bottom can be written as
U bottom = diag

 ∏
t∈[K]
1
βs+K − βt

s∈[T ]
 · V ·
diag

 ∏
t∈[K]
(αr − βt)

r∈[N ]
 , (5)
where V is a T ×N matrix such that
Vi,j =
∏
t∈[T ]\{i}
αj − βt+K
βi+K − βt+K .
Since {βt}Kt=1 ∩ {αr}Nr=1 = ∅, and since all the βi’s are distinct, it follows from (5) that U bottom can be obtained from V by
multiplying each row and each column by a nonzero element, and hence U bottom is an MDS matrix as well.
D. The Uncoded Version of LCC
In Section IV-B, we have described the LCC scheme, which provides an S-resilient, A-secure, and T -private scheme as long
as (K + T − 1) deg f + S + 2A+ 1 ≤ N . Instead of explicitly following the same construction, a variation of LCC can be
made by instead selecting the values of αi’s from the set {βj}j∈[K] (not necessarily distinctly).
We refer to this approach as the uncoded version of LCC, which essentially recovers the uncoded repetition scheme, which
simply replicates each Xi onto multiple workers. By replicating every Xi between bN/Kc and dN/Ke times, it can tolerate at
most S stragglers and A adversaries, whenever
S + 2A ≤ bN/Kc − 1, (6)
which achieves the optimum resiliency and security when the number of workers is small and no data privacy is required
(specifically, N < K deg f − 1 and T = 0, see Section V).
When privacy is taken into account (i.e., T > 0), an alternative approach in place of repetition is to instead store each input
variable using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [38] over bN/Kc to dN/Ke machines. This approach achieves any (S,A, T )
tuple whenever N ≥ K(S + 2A+ deg f · T + 1). However, it does not improve LCC.
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E. Proof of Lemma 1
We start by defining the following notations. For any multilinear function f defined on V with degree d, let Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d
denote its d input entries (i.e., Xi = (Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d) and f is linear with respect to each entry). Let V1, ...,Vd be the
vector space that contains the values of the entries. For brevity, we denote deg f by d in this appendix. We first provide the
proof of inequality (3).
Proof of inequality (3). Without loss of generality, we assume both the encoding and decoding functions are deterministic in this
proof, as the randomness does not help with decodability.19 Similar to [30], we define the minimum recovery threshold, denoted
by R∗(N,K, f), as the minimum number of workers that the master has to wait to guarantee decodability, among all linear
encoding schemes. Then we essentially need to prove that R∗(N,K, f) ≥ R∗LCC(N,K, f), i.e., R∗(N,K, f) ≥ (K − 1)d+ 1
when N ≥ Kd− 1, and R∗(N,K, f) ≥ N − bN/Kc+ 1 when N < Kd− 1.
Obviously R∗(N,K, f) is a non-decreasing function with respect to N . Hence, it suffices to prove that R∗(N,K, f) ≥
N − bN/Kc+ 1 when N ≤ Kd− 1. We prove this converse bound by induction.
(a) If d = 1, then f is a linear function, and we aim to prove R∗(N,K, f) ≥ N + 1 for N ≤ K − 1. This essentially means
that no valid computing schemes can be found when N < K. Assuming the opposite, suppose we can find a valid computation
design using at most K − 1 workers, then there is a decoding function that computes all f(Xi)’s given the results from these
workers.
Because the encoding functions are linear, we can thus find a non-zero vector (a1, ..., aK) ∈ FK such that when Xi = aiV
for any V ∈ V, the coded variable X˜i stored by any worker equals the padded random key, which is a constant. This leads to a
fixed output from the decoder. On the other hand, because f is assumed to be non-zero, the computing results {f(Xi)}i∈[K] is
variable for different values of V , which leads to a contradiction. Hence, we have prove the converse bound for d = 1.
(b) Suppose we have a matching converse for any multilinear function with d = d0. We now prove the lower bound for any
multilinear function f of degree d0 + 1. Similar to part (a), it is easy to prove that R∗(N,K, f) ≥ N + 1 for N ≤ K − 1.
Hence, we focus on N ≥ K.
The proof idea is to construct a multilinear function f ′ with degree d0 based on function f , and to lower bound the minimum
recovery threshold of f using that of f ′. More specifically, this is done by showing that given any computation design for
function f , a computation design can also be developed for the corresponding f ′, which achieves a recovery threshold that is
related to that of the scheme for f .
In particular, for any non-zero function f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0+1), we let f
′ be a function which takes
inputs Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 and returns a linear map, such that given any Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0+1, we have
f ′(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0)(Xi,d0+1) = f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0+1). One can verify that f
′ is a multilinear function with degree
d0, Given parameters K and N , we now develop a computation strategy for f ′ for a dataset of K inputs and a cluster of
N ′ , N −K workers, which achieves a recovery threshold of R∗(N,K, f)− (K − 1). We construct this computation strategy
based on an encoding strategy of f that achieves the recovery threshold R∗(N,K, f). For brevity, we refer to these two schemes
as the f ′-scheme and f -scheme respectively.
Because the encoding functions are linear, we consider the encoding matrix, denoted by G ∈ FK×N , and defined as the
coefficients of the encoding functions X˜i =
∑K
j=1XjGji+ z˜i, where z˜i denotes the value of the random key padded to variable
X˜i. Following the same arguments we used in the d = 1 case, the left null space of G must be {0}. Consequently, the rank of
G equals K, and we can find a subset K of K workers such that the corresponding columns of G form a basis of FK . Hence,
we can construct the f ′-scheme by letting each of the N ′ , N −K workers store the coded version of (Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,d0)
that is stored by a unique respective worker in [N ] \ K in f -scheme.20
Now it suffices to prove that the above construction achieves a recovery threshold of R∗(N,K, f)− (K − 1). Equivalently,
we need to prove that given any subset S of [N ]\K of size R∗(N,K, f)− (K − 1), the values of f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , x)
for any i ∈ [K] and x ∈ V are decodable from the computing results of workers in S.
We exploit the decodability of the computation design for function f . For any j ∈ K, the set S ∪K\{j} has size R∗(N,K, f).
Consequently, for any vector (x1,d0+1, ..., xK,d0+1) ∈ VKd0+1, we have that {f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , xi,d0+1)}i∈[K] is decodable
given the results from workers in S ∪ K\{j} computed in f -scheme, if each xi,d0+1 is used as the (d0 + 1)th entree for each
input.
Because columns of G with indices in K form a basis of FK , we can find values for each input Xi,d0+1 such that workers
in K would store 0 for the Xi,d0+1 entry in the f -scheme. We denote these values by x¯1,d0+1, ..., x¯K,d0+1. Note that if
these values are taken as inputs, workers in K would return constant 0 due to the multilinearity of f . Hence, decoding
f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , x¯i,d0+1) only requires results from workers not in K, i.e., it can be decoded given computing results
from workers in S using the f -scheme. Note that these results can be directly computed from corresponding results in the
f ′-scheme. We have proved the decodability of f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , x) for x = x¯i,d0+1.
19Note that this argument requires the assumption that the decoder does not have access to the random keys, as assumed in Section II.
20For breivity, in this proof we instead index these N −K workers also using the set [N ] \ K, following the natural bijection.
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Now it remains to prove the decodability of f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , x) for each i for general x ∈ V. For any j ∈ K, let
a(j) ∈ FK be a non-zero vector that is orthogonal to all columns of G with indices in K\{j}. If a(j)i x+ x¯i,d0+1 is used for each
input Xi,d0+1 in the f -scheme, then workers in K\{j} would store 0 for the Xi,d0+1 entry, and return constant 0 due to the
multilinearity of f . Recall that f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , a
(j)
i x+ x¯i,d0+1) is assumed to be decodable in the f -scheme given results
from workers in S ∪K\{j} . Following the same arguments above, one can prove that f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , a(j)i x+ x¯i,d0+1)
is also decodable using the f ′-scheme. Hence, the same applies for a(j)i f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , x) due to multilinearity of f .
Because columns of G with indices in K form a basis of FK , the vectors a(j) for j ∈ K also from a basis. Consequently,
for any i there is a non-zero a(j)i , and thus f(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,d0 , x) is decodable. This completes the proof of decodability.
To summarize, we have essentially proved that R∗(N,K, f)− (K− 1) ≥ R∗(N −K,K, f ′). We can verify that the converse
bound R∗(N,K, f) ≥ N − bN/Kc + 1 under the condition N ≤ Kd − 1 can be derived given the above result and the
induction assumption, for any function f with degree d0 + 1.
(c) Thus, a matching converse holds for any d ∈ N+, which proves inequality (3).
Now we proceed to prove the rest of Lemma 1, explicitly, we aim to prove that the recovery threshold of any T -private
encoding scheme is at least RLCC(N,K, f) + T · deg f . Inequality (3) essentially covers the case for T = 0. Hence, we focus
on T > 0. To simplify the proof, we prove a stronger version of this statement: when T > 0, any valid T -private encoding
scheme uses at least N ≥ RLCC(N,K, f) + T · deg f workers. Equivalently, we aim to show that N ≥ (K + T − 1) deg f + 1
for any such scheme.
We prove this fact using an inductive approach. To enable an inductive structure, we prove a even stronger converse by
considering a more general class of computing tasks and a larger class of encoding schemes, formally stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider a dataset with inputs X , (X1, ..., XK) ∈ (Fd)K , and an input vector Γ , (Γ1, ...,ΓK) which belongs
to a given subspace of FK with dimension r > 0; a set of N workers where each can take a coded variable in Fd+1 and
return the product of its elements; and a computing task where the master aim to recover Yi , Xi,1 · ... · Xi,d · Γi. If the
inputs entries are encoded separately such that each of the first d entries assigned to each worker are some TX > 0-privately
linearly coded version of the corresponding entries of Xi’s, and the (d+ 1)th entry assigned to each worker is a T -privately21
linearly coded version of Γ, moreover, if each Γi (as a variable) is non-zero, then any valid computing scheme requires
N ≥ (TX +K − 1)d+ T + r.
Proof. Lemma 3 is proved by induction with respect to the tuple (d, T, r). Specifically, we prove that (a) Lemma 3 holds when
(d, T, r) = (0, 0, 1); (b) If Lemma 3 holds for any (d, T, r) = (d0, 0, r0), then it holds when (d, T, r) = (d0, 0, r0 + 1); (c) If
Lemma 3 holds for any (d, T, r) = (d0, 0, r0), then it holds when (d, T, r) = (d0, T, r0) for any T ; (d) If Lemma 3 holds
for any d = d0 and arbitrary values of T and r, then it holds if (d, T, r) = (d0 + 1, 0, 1). Assuming the correctness of these
statements, Lemma 3 directly follows by induction’s principle. Now we provide the proof of these statements as follows.
(a). When (d, T, r) = (0, 0, 1), we need to show that at least 1 worker is needed. This directly follows from the decodability
requirement, because the master aims to recover a variable, and at least one variable is needed to provide the information.
(b). Assuming that for any (d, T, r) = (d0, 0, r0) and any K and TX, any valid computing scheme requires N ≥ (TX +K −
1)d0 + r workers, we need to prove that for (d, T, r) = (d0, 0, r0 + 1), at least (TX +K − 1)d0 + r0 + 1 workers are needed.
We prove this fact by fixing an arbitrary valid computing scheme for (d, T, r) = (d0, 0, r0 + 1). For brevity, let Γ˜i denotes the
coded version of Γ stored at worker i. We consider the following two possible scenarios: (i) there is a worker i such that Γ˜i is
not identical (up to a constant factor) to any variable Γj , or (ii) for any worker i, Γ˜i is identical (up to a constant factor) to
some Γj .
For case (i), similar to the ideas we used to prove inequality (3), it suffices to show that if the given computing scheme
uses N workers, we can construct another computation scheme achieving the same TX , for a different computing task with
parameters d = d0 and r = r0, using at most N − 1 workers.
Recall that we assumed that there is a worker i, such that Γ˜i is not identical (up to a constant factor) to any Γj . We can
always restrict the value of Γ to a subspace with dimension r0, such that Γ˜i becomes a constant 0. After this operation, from
the computation results of the rest N − 1 workers, the master can recover a computing function with r = r0 and non-zero Γj’s,
which provides the needed computing scheme.
For case (ii), because each Γj is assumed to be non-zero, we can partition the set of indices j into distinct subsets, such that
any j and j′ are in the same subset iff Γj is a constant multiple of Γj′ . We denote these subsets by J1, ...,Jm. Moreover, for
any k ∈ [m], let Ik denote the subset of indices i such that Γ˜i is identical (up to a constant factor) to Γj for j in Jk.
Now for any k ∈ [m], we can restrict the value of Γ to a subspace with dimension r0, such that Γj is zero for any j ∈ Jk.
After applying this operation, from the computation results of workers in [N ]\Ik, the master can recover a computing function
with r = r0, where K ′ = K − |Jk| sub-functions has non-zero Γj’s. By applying the induction assumption on this provided
21For this lemma, we assume that no padded random variable is used for a 0-private encoding scheme.
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computing scheme, we have N − |Ik| ≥ (TX +K − |Jk| − 1)d0 + r0. By taking the summation of the this inequality over
k ∈ [m], we have
Nm−
m∑
k=1
|Ik| ≥ (TXm+Km−K −m)d0 + r0m. (7)
Recall that for any worker i, Γ˜i is identical (up to a constant factor) to some Γj , we have ∪k∈[m]Ik = [N ]. Thus,
∑
k |Ik| ≥ N .
Consequently, inequality (7) implies that
Nm−N ≥ (TXm+Km−K −m)d0 + r0m. (8)
Note that r0 + 1 > 1, which implies that at least two Γj’s are not identical up to a constant factor. Hence, m− 1 > 0, and (8)
is equivalently
N ≥ (TXm+Km−K −m)d0 + r0m
m− 1 (9)
= (TX +K − 1)d0 + r0 + ((TX − 1)d0 + r0) 1
m− 1 . (10)
Since TX and r0 are both positive, we have (TX − 1)d0 + r0 > 0. Consequently, ((TX − 1)d0 + r0) 1m−1 > 0, and we have
N ≥ (TX +K − 1)d0 + r0 + 1, (11)
which proves the induction statement.
(c). Assuming that for any (d, T, r) = (d0, 0, r0), any valid computing scheme requires N ≥ (TX +K − 1)d0 + r0 workers,
we need to prove that for (d, T, r) = (d0, T0, r0), N ≥ (TX +K − 1)d0 + T0 + r0. Equivalently, we aim to show that for any
T0 > 0, in order to provide T0-privacy to the d0 + 1th entry, T0 extra worker is needed. Similar to the earlier steps, we consider
an arbitrary valid computing scheme for (d, T, r) = (d0, T0, r0) that uses N workers. We aim to construct a new scheme for
(d, T, r) = (d0, 0, r0), for the same computation task and the same TX, which uses at most N − T0 workers.
Recall that if an encoding scheme is T0 private, then given any subset of at most T0 workers, denoted by T , we have
I(Γ; Γ˜T ) = 0. Consequently, conditioned on Γ˜T = 0, the entropy of the variable Γ remains unchanged. This indicates that
Γ can be any possible value when Γ˜T = 0. Hence, we can let the values of the padded random variables be some linear
combinations of the elements of Γ, such that worker in T returns constant 0.
Now we construct an encoding scheme as follows. Firstly it is easy to show that when the master aims to recover a
non-constant function, at least T0 + 1 workers are needed to provide non-zero information regarding the inputs. Hence, we
can arbitrarily select a subset of T0 workers, denoted by T . As we have proved, we can find fix the values of the padded
random variables such that Γ˜T = 0. Due to multilinearity of the computing task, these workers in T also returns constant 0.
Conditioned on these values, the decoder essentially computes the final output only based on the rest N − T0 workers, which
provides the needed computing scheme. Moreover, as we have proved that the values of the padded random variables can
be chosen to be some linear combinations of the elements of Γ, our obtained computing scheme encodes Γ linearly. This
completes the proof for the induction statement.
(d). Assuming that for any d = d0 and arbitrary values of T and r, any valid computing scheme requires N ≥ (TX +K −
1)d0 + T + r workers, we need to prove that for (d, T, r) = (d0 + 1, 0, 1), N ≥ (TX +K − 1)(d0 + 1) + 1. Observing that for
any computing task with r = 1, by fixing an non-zero Γ, it essentially computes K functions where each multiplies d0 variables.
Moreover, for each function, by viewing the first (d0 − 1) entries as a vector X ′i and by viewing the last entry as a scalar Γ′i,
it essentially recovers the case where the parameter d is reduced by 1, K remain unchanged, and r equals K. By adapting
any computing scheme in the same way, we have TX remain unchanged, and T becomes TX. Then by induction assumption,
any computing scheme for (d, T, r) = (d0 + 1, 0, 1) requires at least (TX +K − 1)d0 + TX +K = (TX +K − 1)(d0 + 1) + 1
workers.
Remark 6. Using exactly the same arguments, Lemma 3 can be extended to the case where the entries of X are encoded under
different privacy requirements. Specifically, if the ith entry is Ti-privately encoded, then at least
∑d
i=1 Ti + (K − 1)d+ T + r
worker is needed. Lemma 3 and this extended version are both tight, in the sense for any parameter values of d, K and r, there
are computing tasks where a computing scheme that uses the matching number of workers can be found, using constructions
similar to the Lagrange coded computing.
Now using Lemma 3, we complete the proof of Lemma 1 for T > 0. Similar to the proof ideas for inequality (3) part (a), we
consider any multilinear function f with degree d, and we find constant vectors V1, ..., Vd, such that f(V1, ..., Vd) is non-zero.
Then by restricting the input variables to be constant multiples of V1, ..., Vd, this computing task reduces to multiplying d
scalars, given K inputs. As stated in Lemma 3 and discussed in part (d) of its induction proof, such computation requires
(T +K − 1)d+ 1 workers. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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F. Optimality on the Resiliency-Security-Privacy Tradeoff for Multilinear Functions
In this appendix, we prove the first part of Theorem 2 using Lemma 1. Specifically, we aim to prove that LCC achieves the
optimal trade-off between resiliency, security, and privacy for any multilinear function f . By comparing Lemma 1 and the
achievability result presented in Theorem 1 and Appendix D, we essentially need to show that for any linear encoding scheme
that can tolerates A adversaries and S stragglers, it can also tolerate S + 2A stragglers.
This converse can be proved by connecting the straggler mitigation problem and the adversary tolerance problem using the
extended concept of Hamming distance for coded computing, which is defined in [30]. Specifically, given any (possibly random)
encoding scheme, its hamming distance is defined as the minimum integer, denoted by d, such that for any two instances of
input X whose outputs Y are different, and for any two possible realizations of the N encoding functions, the computing
results given the encoded version of these two inputs, using the two lists of encoding functions respectively, differs for at least
d workers.
It was shown in [30] that this hamming distance behaves similar to its classical counter part: an encoding scheme is S-resilient
and A-secure whenever S + 2A ≤ d− 1. Hence, for any encoding scheme that is A-secure and S-reselient, it has a hamming
distance of at least S + 2A+ 1. Consequently it can tolerate S + 2A stragglers. Combining the above and Lemma 1, we have
completed the proof.
G. Optimality on the Resiliency-Privacy Tradeoff for General Multivariate Polynomials
In this appendix, we prove the second part of Theorem 2 using Lemma 1. Specifically, we aim to prove that LCC achieves
the optimal trade-off between resiliency and privacy, for general multivariate polynomial f . The proof is carried out by showing
that for any function f that allows S-resilient T -private designs, there exists a multilinear function with the same degree for
which a computation scheme can be found that achieves the same requirement.
Specifically, given any function f with degree d, we aim to provide an explicit construction of an multilinear function,
denoted by f ′, which achieves the same requirements. The construction satisfies certain properties to ensure this fact. Both the
construction and the properties are formally stated in the following lemma (which is proved in Appendix H):
Lemma 4. Given any function f of degree d, let f ′ be a map from Vd → U such that f ′(Z1, ..., Zd) =∑
S⊆[d] (−1)|S|f(
∑
j∈S Zj) for any {Zj}j∈[d] ∈ Vd. Then f ′ is multilinear with respect to the d inputs. Moreover, if
the characteristic of the base field F is 0 or greater than d, then f ′ is non-zero.
Assuming the correctness of Lemma 4, it suffices to prove that f ′ enables computation designs that tolerates at least the
same number of stragglers, and provides at least the same level of data privacy, compared to that of f . We prove this fact by
constructing such computing schemes for f ′ given any design for f .
Note that f ′ is defined as a linear combination of functions f(
∑
j∈S Zj), each of which is a composition of a linear map and
f . Given the linearity of the encoding design, any computation scheme of f can be directly applied to any of these functions,
achieving the same resiliency and privacy requirements. Since the decoding functions are linear, the same scheme also applies
to linear combinations of them, which includes f ′. Hence, the resiliency-privacy tradeoff achievable for f can also be achieved
by f ′. This concludes the proof.
H. Proof of Lemma 4
We first prove that f ′ is multilinear with respect to the d inputs. Recall that by definition, f is a linear combination of
monomials, and f ′ is constructed based on f through a linear operation. By exploiting the commutativity of these these two
linear relations, we only need to show individually that each monomial in f is transformed into a multilinear function.
More specifically, let f be the sum of monomials hk , Uk·
dk∏
`=1
hk,`(·) where k belongs to a finite set, Uk ∈ U, dk ∈ {0, 1, ..., d},
and each hk,` is a linear map from V to F. Let h′k denotes the contribution of hk in f ′, then for any Z = (Z1, ..., Zd) ∈ Vd
we have
h′k(Z) =
∑
S⊆[d]
(−1)|S|hk
∑
j∈S
Zj

=
∑
S⊆[d]
(−1)|S|Uk ·
dk∏
`=1
hk,`
∑
j∈S
Zj
. (12)
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By utilizing the linearity of each hk,`, we can write h′k as
h′k(Z) = Uk ·
∑
S⊆[d]
(−1)|S|
dk∏
`=1
∑
j∈S
hk,` (Zj)
= Uk ·
∑
S⊆[d]
(−1)|S|
dk∏
`=1
d∑
j=1
1(j ∈ S) · hk,` (Zj) (13)
Then by viewing each subset S of [d] as a map from [d] to {0, 1}, we have22
h′k(Z) = Uk
∑
s∈{0,1}d
(
d∏
m=1
(−1)sm
)
·
dk∏
`=1
d∑
j=1
sj · hk,` (Zj)
= Uk
∑
j∈[d]dk
∑
s∈{0,1}d
(
d∏
m=1
(−1)sm
)
·
dk∏
`=1
(sj` · hk,` (Zj`)). (14)
Note that the product
dk∏
`=1
sj` can be alternatively written as
d∏
m=1
s
#(m in j)
m , where #(m in j) denotes the number of elements
in j that equals m. Hence
h′k(Z) = Uk ·
∑
j∈[d]dk
∑
s∈{0,1}d
(
d∏
m=1
(
(−1)sms#(m in j)m
))
·
dk∏
`=1
hk,`(Zj`)
= Uk ·
∑
j∈[d]dk
 d∏
m=1
∑
s∈{0,1}
(−1)ss#(m in j)

·
dk∏
`=1
hk,`(Zj`). (15)
The sum
∑
s∈{0,1}
(−1)ss#(m in j) is non-zero only if m appears in j. Consequently, among all terms that appear in (15), only
the ones with degree dk = d and distinct elements in j have non-zero contribution. More specifically, 23
h′k(Z) = (−1)d · 1(dk = d) · Uk ·
∑
g∈Sd
d∏
j=1
hk,g(j) (Zj). (16)
Recall that f ′ is a linear combination of h′k’s. Consequently, it is a multilinear function.
Now we prove that f ′ is non-zero. From equation (16), we can show that when all the elements Zj’s are identical, f ′(Z)
equals the evaluation of the highest degree terms of f multiplied by a constant (−1)dd! with Zj as the input for any j. Given
that the highest degree terms can not be zero, and (−1)dd! is non-zero as long as the characteristic of the field F is greater
than d, we proved that f ′ is non-zero.
I. Optimality in randomness
In this appendix, we prove the optimality of LCC in terms of the amount of randomness needed in data encoding, which is
formally stated in the following theorem.
22Here we define 00 = 1.
23Here Sd denotes the symmetric group of degree d.
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Theorem 3. (Optimal randomness) Any linear encoding scheme that universally achieves a same tradeoff point specified in
Theorem 1 for all linear functions f (i.e., (S,A, T ) such that K + T + S + 2A = N ) must use an amount of randomness no
less than that of LCC.
Proof. The proof is taken almost verbatim from [47], Chapter 3. In what follows, an (n, k, r, z)Ftq secure RAID scheme is a
storage scheme over Ftq (where Fq is a field with q elements) in which k message symbols are coded into n storage servers, such
that the k message symbols are reconstructible from any n− r servers, and any z servers are information theoretically oblivious
to the message symbols. Further, such a scheme is assumed to use v random entries as keys, and by [47], Proposition 3.1.1,
must satisfy n− r ≥ k + z.
Theorem 4. [47], Theorem 3.2.1. A linear rate-optimal (n, k, r, z)Ftq secure RAID scheme uses at least zt keys over Fq
(i.e., v ≥ z).
Clearly, in our scenario V can be seen as FdimVq for some q. Further, by setting N = n, T = z, and t = dimV, it follows
from Theorem 4 that any encoding scheme which guarantees information theoretic privacy against sets of T colluding workers
must use at least T random entries {Zi}i∈[T ].
J. Optimality of LCC for Linear Regression
In this section, we prove that the proposed LCC scheme achieves the minimum possible recovery threshold R∗ to within a
factor of 2, for the linear regression problem discussed in Section 6.
As the first step, we prove a lower bound on R∗ for linear regression. More specifically, we show that for any coded
computation scheme, the master always needs to wait for at least dnr e workers to be able to decode the final result, i.e.,
R∗ ≥ dnr e. Before starting the proof, we first note that since here we consider a more general scenario where workers can
compute any function on locally stored coded sub-matrices (not necessarily matrix-matrix multiplication), the converse result in
Theorem 2 no longer holds.
To prove the lower bound, it is equivalent to show that, for any coded computation scheme and any subset N of workers, if
the master can recover X>Xw given the results from workers in N , then we must have |N | ≥ dnr e. Suppose the condition in
the above statement holds, then we can find encoding, computation, and decoding functions such that for any possible values of
X and w, the composition of these functions returns the correct output.
Note that within a GD iteration, each worker performs its local computation only based on its locally stored coded sub-matrices
and the weight vector w. Hence, if the master can decode the final output from the results of the workers in a subset N , then
the composition of the decoding function and the computation functions of these workers essentially computes X>Xw, using
only the coded sub-matrices stored at these workers and the vector w. Hence, if any class of input values X gives the same
coded sub-matrices for each worker in N , then the product X>Xw must also be the same given any w.
Now we consider the class of input matrices X such that all coded sub-matrices stored at workers in N equal the values of
the corresponding coded sub-matrices when X is zero. Since 0>0w is zero for any w, X>Xw must also be zero for all
matrices X in this class and any w. However, for real matrices X = 0 is the only solution to that condition. Thus, zero matrix
must be the only input matrix that belongs to this class.
Recall that all the encoding functions are assumed to be linear. We consider the collection of all encoding functions that are
used by workers in N , which is also a linear map. As we have just proved, the kernel of this linear map is {0}. Hence, its
rank must be at least the dimension of the input matrix, which is dm. On the other hand, its rank is upper bounded by the
dimension of the output, where each encoding function from a worker contributes at most rdmn . Consequently, the number of
workers in N must be at least dnr e to provide sufficient rank to support the computation.
Having proved that R∗ ≥ dnr e, the factor of two characterization of LCC directly follows since R∗ ≤ RLCC = 2dnr e − 1 <
2dnr e ≤ 2R∗.
Note that the converse bound proved above applies to the most general computation model, i.e., there are no assumptions
made on the encoding functions or the functions that each worker computes. If additional requirements are taken into account,
we can show that LCC achieves the exact optimum recovery threshold (e.g., see [30]).
K. Complete Experimental Results
In this section, we present the complete experimental results using the LCC scheme proposed in the paper, the gradient
coding (GC) scheme [10] (the cyclic repetition scheme), the matrix-vector multiplication based (MVM) scheme [17], and the
uncoded scheme for which there is no data redundancy across workers, measured from running linear regression on Amazon
EC2 clusters.
In particular, experiments are performed for the following 3 scenarios.
• Scenario 1 & 2: # of input data point m = 8000, # of features d = 7000.
• Scenario 3: # of input data point m = 160000, # of features d = 500.
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In scenarios 2 and 3, we artificially introduce stragglers by imposing a 0.5 seconds delay on each worker with probability
5% in each iteration.
We list the detailed breakdowns of the run-times in 3 experiment scenarios in Tables II, III, and IV respectively. In particular,
the computation (comp.) time is measured as the summation of the maximum local processing time among all non-straggling
workers, over 100 iterations. The communication (comm.) time is computed as the difference between the total run-time and
the computation time.
Table II
BREAKDOWNS OF THE RUN-TIMES IN SCENARIO ONE.
schemes # batches/ recovery comm. comp. totalworker (r) threshold time time run-time
uncoded 1 40 24.125 s 0.237 s 24.362 s
GC 10 31 6.033 s 2.431 s 8.464 s
MVM Rd. 1 5 8 1.245 s 0.561 s 1.806 s
MVM Rd. 2 5 8 1.340 s 0.480 s 1.820 s
MVM total 10 - 2.585 s 1.041 s 3.626 s
LCC 10 7 1.719 s 1.868 s 3.587 s
Table III
BREAKDOWNS OF THE RUN-TIMES IN SCENARIO TWO.
schemes # batches/ recovery comm. comp. totalworker (r) threshold time time run-time
uncoded 1 40 7.928 s 44.772 s 52.700 s
GC 10 31 14.42 s 2.401 s 16.821 s
MVM Rd. 1 5 8 2.254 s 0.475 s 2.729 s
MVM Rd. 2 5 8 2.292 s 0.586 s 2.878 s
MVM total 10 - 4.546 s 1.061 s 5.607 s
LCC 10 7 2.019 s 1.906 s 3.925 s
Table IV
BREAKDOWNS OF THE RUN-TIMES IN SCENARIO THREE.
schemes # batches/ recovery comm. comp. totalworker (r) threshold time time run-time
uncoded 1 40 0.229 s 41.765 s 41.994 s
GC 10 31 8.627 s 2.962 s 11.589 s
MVM Rd. 1 5 8 3.807 s 0.664 s 4.471 s
MVM Rd. 2 5 8 52.232 s 0.754 s 52.986 s
MVM total 10 - 56.039 s 1.418 s 57.457 s
LCC 10 7 1.962 s 2.597 s 4.541 s
